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We conduct a comprehensive examination on how relationship lenders price loans to small opaque 
firms using the rich matched data set of Japanese firms and their main banks.    Our major findings are: 
1. Neither measures for a borrower firm’s transparency to the public (outsiders) nor measures for the 
firm’s transparency to its main bank affect the lending rate. 2. A bank suffering from a greater ratio of 
non-performing loans to total asset charges a higher lending rate.    3. Treating the non-price terms of a 
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1. Introduction 
“Relationship lending” is said to be a lending technology that alleviates asymmetric information 
present between a bank and opaque small borrowing firms.  Written documents, such as financial 
statements, often do not adequately represent their credit risk.   A long financial (lending) relationship 
with a firm, however, allows a bank to make informal contacts with the firm, by which the bank 
accumulates unrecorded “soft” information on the firm’s credit worthiness, information which other 
spot creditors are not able to gather.  With such “soft” information, “relationship lenders” may 
effectively monitor opaque firms.     
Long relationships, which may result in reduced asymmetric information, are great benefits to 
borrowing firms.    The strong relationship, however, has its costs.    A relationship lender monopolizes 
certain types of information on the credit worthiness of a small borrowing firm.  Consequently, the 
bank takes advantage of its stronger position when negotiating credit terms with the firm and earns an 
extra “rent” relative to the interests that would be earned in competitive credit markets.
1   
Such a “rent seeking” behavior could be more avaricious when banks themselves are financially 
distressed.  It is when a bank faces financial hardship that the incentive to take advantage of its 
relationships with long-term clients (borrowers) grows.    A bank may pass on to the borrowers the cost 
of any perceived risks that they face or actual costs that they incur to the borrowers.  For instance, 
seeking more profits to be added to its capital, a bank, whose risk based capital to asset ratio is close to 
the Basel regulatory minimum, may charge higher lending rates.  Or banks may simply request 
borrowers to share the costs of writing off non-performing loans by setting higher lending rates.  If 
such premiums on lending rates associated with the “hold up” problem are a large burden on small 
firms, policy measures need to be aimed at reducing small firms’ dependence on their main bank. 
Then how do relationship lenders determine their lending rates for (“price”) loans to small firms 
                                                   
1 The problem of a bank taking advantage of the collecting of proprietary information on a borrower in a long 
relationship by earning extra rent is called the “hold up” problem.  This problem is discussed in Greenbaum et. al 
(1989), Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992).   2
that are generally not transparent to external creditors?  The answer to this question requires 
comprehensive information: both quantitative and qualitative, on those involved in the lending 
contracts, lender banks and borrower firms, as well as on relationships between such the lenders and 
borrowers.   
We constructed the rich matched data set of firms and their relationship lenders using the unique 
survey data provided in Japan, a large economy where relationship lending has been established.    The 
observed length of relationships tends to be much longer in Japan and Germany than in other parts of 
the world including the United States.  Such strong relationships as are found in Japan and Germany 
are known as the “main bank” system and the “house bank” system, respectively.    The Japanese main 
bank system’s influence on large firms (so called keiretsu firms) have been widely studied.
2  A s   H o s h i  
and Kashyap (2001) argue, however, financial liberalization in the 1980s enabled large keiretsu firms to 
severe their ties with their main banks in favor of unintermediated firms.   Thus, the main bank 
system was only kept afloat in small business finances where asymmetric information is more serious.   
Yet, studies on the main banks’ relationships with small firms have been sparse.     
As is evident, use of the recent Japanese data is ideal for exploring the “hold up” problem because 
not only have the ultra-long relationships allowed the main banks to garner information on borrowing 
firms but because Japanese banks in the 1990s through the early 2000s, which had been troubled with 
the staggering non-performing loans whose magnitude was unparalleled in the history of the world, had 
the strongest incentive to “hold up” relationship borrowers. 
Using the Japanese data from the early 2000s, we ask the following question.    In sustained main 
bank relationships, how do banks price loans?    The following three major questions naturally arise.     
First, do relationship lenders (banks) remain concerned about the opacity of borrowing firms?    In 
other words, do banks still value more transparency in terms of greater availability of (verifiable) hard 
                                                   
2  Representative works are Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), Gibson (1995) and Weinstein and Yafeh (1998). 
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records (documents) in assessing firms’ credit quality when they are allowed to appropriate valuable 
unrecorded “soft” information?  Does non-financial recorded information on borrowers or limited 
publicly available non-financial information (which is seemingly less informative than proprietary soft 
information) compensate for financial statements that are usually less detailed than those of larger 
firms?
 3 
Second, do financially distressed banks really take advantage of their stronger position as a 
relationship lender and charge higher lending rates?    If so, to what extent?    Are small firms exploited 
by the main bank system?     
Third, is loan security still important to banks when they establish strong relationships with 
borrowers?  Do relationship lenders charge lower lending rates on secured loans than on unsecured 
loans, just as ordinary lenders are presumed to do?    It is true that a large number of firms with a longer 
relationship with their bank still pledges collateral to the bank.  Some firms use public guarantees to 
borrow from their relationship lender. 
The three issues raised above are major subjects of our interest but are not the only relevant issues.   
Conclusions are drawn only when other determinants of pricing such as firms’ financial health and 
various firm characteristics are adequately controlled.  In this regards, only the matched 
lender-borrower data set allows us to conduct a comprehensive examination of relationship lenders’ 
pricing of small business loans.     
Analyzing a bank’s pricing of loans is complicated since a bank can tighten the terms of a loan to 
a riskier firm not only by raising the lending rate of the loan, but also by tightening non-price terms: 
requesting that the loan be secured by collateral or by a publicly granted guarantee, or that loan 
maturity be shorter.
4  Without properly incorporating non-price terms into an empirical model, biases 
                                                   
3 Berger and Udell (2002), Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2005) and Berger and Udell (2006) use 
transactions-based lending as a term for lending based on hard information in contrast to relationship lending. 
 
4  Inderst and Mueller (2006) propose an alternative explanation to endogenous collateral, which will be discussed   4
on estimates emerge not only in the effects of the non-price terms on the lending rate but also in those 
of other factors.  Instrumental variables are used to avoid estimation biases stemming from such 
“non-price” terms.     
Our major findings are summarized in the following three points:   
First, neither measures for a borrowing firm’s transparency to the public (outsiders) nor measures 
for the firm’s transparency to its main bank affect the lending rate.  This is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that a relationship lender is ultimately indifferent to a firm’s transparency beyond 
financial statements measured by the likelihood to disclose recorded information to either outsiders or 
to the lender itself. 
Second, a financially distressed bank with a large percentage of non-performing loans charges a 
higher lending rate.    This suggests that main banks take advantage of the proprietary information they 
have about their client firms.    When the average lending rate is only 2.34%, the premium due to a five 
percentage point increase in the ratio of non-performing loans to total asset for small firms exceeds 60 
basis points. 
Third, treating the non-price terms of a loan contract as endogenous variables is crucial in 
consistently estimating a main bank’s lending rate.    When collateral or a public credit guarantee for a 
loan are not instrumented, estimation results become implausible in many regards.     
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows.  In section 2, theories are discussed.  In 
section 3, data and econometric issues are set out.  In section 4, results are reported and interpreted.  
In section 5, several policy implications are drawn.    Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2. What Influence the Pricing of the Relationship Lending? 
                                                                                                                                                                                
later.   5
In this section, we discuss factors that may or may not influence prices of loans in greater details. 
 
The firm’s “transparency” 
A main bank likely has privileged access to unrecorded “soft” information about an opaque 
borrower with whom the bank has a long relationship.  Consequently, the main bank assesses the 
borrower’s credit quality based on collected soft information that the bank obtains through informal 
contacts with the borrower.  Thus, whether a borrowing firm is transparent to outsiders (engaged in 
greater disclosure) or the firm discloses (verifiable) records (documents) to the bank, which is likely to 
be less informative than proprietary “soft” information to the bank is less likely to be relevant to the 
main bank’s lending decisions.     
 
The main bank’s financial health 
If a main bank relationship is monopolistic, a “hold up” problem may arise allowing it to take 
advantage of its stronger bargaining position when negotiating contract terms with a smaller borrowing 
firm and pass on some risks that they face or costs that may be incurred.
5  If a bank fails to meet the 
Basel standard for the risk adjusted capital to asset ratio, a prudential regulator will intervene and its 
businesses will be adversely affected.  Writing off non-performing loans incurs a large amount of 
accounting losses.
6 
7   Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) test the importance of the influences of a 
                                                   
5  Main bank relationships may not be perfectly monopolistic.    Unlike in the United States, where small firms usually 
borrow from a single bank, in Japan, SMEs borrow from multiple banks including their main bank.  Thus, main 
banks may face competitive pressures from non main bank lenders who may offer lower lending rates to firms with 
whom they have non relationships.  Nevertheless, Japanese main bank relationships typically last for a very long 
time (the average lending relationship period for our sample firms, which is discussed later, is 36 years).  The fact 
that firms seldom switch their main bank may imply that, in the main bank relationship, not only does the lender 
engage in the relationship specific investment for monitoring but the borrower also bears relationship specific sunk 
costs that make a borrower less willing to withdraw from the relationship.  How bank competition and main bank 
relationships interplay is one of the least explored subjects.    According to Kano et al. (2006), small shinkin banks in 
regions with less bank competition reduce lending rates to their borrowers as the main bank relationship continues, but 
such interplay between bank competition and lending terms has not been observed for other types of banks. 
 
6 Van den Heuvel (2002) and Diamond and Rajan (2000) theoretically show that weak bank health has a negative   6
bank’s financial health on the lending rate, which they call “bank effcts,” using the contract based data 
on loans to large firms.  They find that poorly capitalized U.S. banks charge higher rates than 
adequately capitalized banks. 
 
Loan security 
The price of a loan (lending rate) is not the only term of a lending contract.    A lender bank makes 
a loan to a borrowing firm at the specified price (lending rate) conditional on various other “terms” of 
the contract.  Such non-price terms of contract include personal or physical collateralization of the 
loan, and a public guarantee of the loan.
8  A lender bank may reduce the lending rate on the loan 
secured by collateral or a personal guarantee.    Likewise, a bank may reduce the lending rate on a loan 
secured under a public guarantee program or in exchange for greater disclosure of a firm. 
Complications arise because such non-price terms, in turn, are likely to be related to the lending 
rate.  A bank may tighten the terms of a loan to a higher risk firm by raising the lending rate and by 
requesting the firm that the loan be secured by either collateral, or a publicly granted guarantee.  
Alternatively, Inderst and Mueller (2006) propose another explanation for endogenous collateral in that 
competitive pressures from other lending institutions (non-relationship lenders) give a relationship 
lender an incentive to request collateral (a relationship lender’s revenue in the case of a borrower’s 
default) in exchange for a lower lending rate (a relationship lender’s revenue when a borrower meets 
contractual requirements on repayments).     
In essence, without doubt, a bank most likely determines the pricing of a loan and various 
                                                                                                                                                                                
effect on a bank’s lending supply function (leading to higher lending rates). 
 
7 If a main bank relationship were not monopolistic and lending markets were competitive, a firm would be able to 
borrow from a financially stronger bank that offers cheaper loans.  In the equilibrium, the price of a loan would be 
equalized across banks with varying financial strength. 
 
8  A bank can also shorten the maturity of a loan or request greater disclosure of a borrowing firm. 
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non-price “terms” simultaneously rather than sequentially.    Thus, when estimating the equation for the 
lending rate, variables that are meant to capture non-price terms should be treated as endogenous 
right-hand side variables.    Otherwise, serious biases would arise in the estimated lending rate.     
In the empirical literature, little deals with endogenous non-price terms.  Some studies do 
mention the importance of non-price terms as a determining factor for lending rates.   Using the 1988 
wave of the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF), Berger and Udell (1995) include dummy 
variables indicating the type of collateral if a loan is collateralized in the regression equation for 
interest rates on lines of credit supplied to small businesses and find some (weak) evidence that interest 
rates on secured loans are higher than those on unsecured loans.
9  Using the data on large firms, 
Strahan (1999) finds that the dummy variable indicating whether a loan is secured is positively 
associated with the lending rate.
10  Using the Italian data, Pozzolo (2004) find that, when various 
borrower (risk) characteristics are controlled, the coefficient of the dummy variable for collateralization 
is negative and significant in the regression equation for the lending rate. 
Cressy and Toivanen (2001) attempt to use the simultaneous equation system in dealing with 
endogenous non-price terms.  However, the variables that capture informational characteristics of a 
borrowing firm are absent in their analysis.  Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) instead intend to 
represent non-price terms by an endogenous fixed effect.    The variables that capture the informational 
characteristics of a borrowing firm, however, are not present in their dataset, either. 
Brick and Palia (2007) estimate the simultaneous system of equations for the lending rate and two 
of the important non-price terms, collateral and fees.   Instruments used for non-price terms, however, 
are problematic.  In the logit regression for the collateralization of a loan, the only significantly 
                                                   
9  Using the same SSBF data, Berger and Udell (1990) find that interest rates on secured loans are on average higher 
than unsecured loans.    They, however, do not control for bank-borrower relationships. 
 
10  Booth and Booth (2006) examine lending contracts from the borrowers’ perspectives.    Using contract based data, 
they estimate borrowing costs for collateralized and uncollateralized loans separately while controlling for the 
borrowers’ decision whether to pledge collateral. 
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estimated coefficient is the coefficient of a dummy variable that is set to unity if either the principal 
owner or the firm has ever defaulted.  This dummy variable does not capture a firm’s incentive to 
offer collateral to the lender bank but its credit risk, and captures a bank’s incentive to secure a loan.  
This is not a valid instrument for an equation characterizing a bank’s pricing behavior.
11 
 
The strength of lender-borrower relationship 
There is a large volume of empirical literature that attempts to investigate whether the strength of 
the relationship reduces the lending rate.    The most often used measure for the strength of the lending 
relationship is its duration.    Petersen and Rajan (1994, 2002) and Berger and Udell (1995) find that, in 
the United States, the longer a lending relationship lasts, the lower the lending rate to a small firm 
becomes.   
Unlike relationships in the US, where lender-borrower relationships are relatively short (11 years 
in Berger and Udell [1995] and 8 years in Cole [1998], both from the Survey of Small Business Finaces 
[SSBF] data), European/Japanese main bank relationships last a very long time.  According to Elsas 
and Krahnen (1998), the length of German house bank relationships is on average 20 to 30 years, 
depending on the size of the firm.   As will be discussed in the next section, the average length of the 
Japanese main bank relationships with small and medium enterprises in our data set is about 35 years.
 
12  Though using the U.S. data, Berger and Udell (1995) discuss that “no additional information is 
revealed after 30 years.”  Elsas and Krahnen (1998) also tell us that what matters to firms is whether 
they have a house (main) bank or not, not how long a relationship they have had with their main bank. 
 
                                                   
11 Bharath et al (2006) estimate the three equation system for loan price, collateralization and maturity using the 
dataset of large US firms.    They use loan amount relative to total debt as an instrument for collateralization. 
 
12  Ongena and Smith (2000) argue that the large discrepancy in the duration of the relationship between Europe/Japan 
and the United States found in the literature is largely attributable to differences in the nature of the employed data 
such as firm size.    In our dataset, however, relationships of smaller firms with their main banks are almost as long as 
those of relatively larger SMEs.   9
The borrowing firm’s financial health 
Lenders may reflect borrowing firms’ financial health in their lending interest rates to deal with 
firms that are not fully transparent to the lenders themselves.  Berger and Udell (2006) reveal that 
some banks depend on (audited) financial statements when lending to small firms.  According to 
discussions of Bernanke and Gertler (1989. 1995) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996, 1999), 
when lenders charge special premiums for financially weak borrowing firms (“external finance 
premiums”) and such premiums are inversely related to the borrowers’ financial strengths (collateral 
value), the effects of the monetary policy are amplified through credit markets.  This is the well 
known “financial accelerator”. Asymmetric information remains between a firm and its main bank no 
matter how close they are to each other as long as they remain separate entities.
13   
 
 
The firm’s credit risk 
A main bank should set its interest rate commensurate with a firm’s mesured credit risk.  Thus, 
the lower the predicted probability of default is, and the higher a credit score for that firm, the lower the 




3. Data and Econometrics 
3.1. Constructing a Matched Panel Data 
                                                   
13  This type of lending is sometimes called scoring lending or financial statement lending, which is one of the types of 
lending, which is collectively known as transactions-based lending.    See Berger and Udell (2002, 2006) and Berger, 
Udell, Miller Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2005) for relevant discussions. 
 
14  There are independent research houses that score small firms based on the internally developed model of a firm’s 
probability of default.    Dunn & Bradstreet is a leading firm that scores the credit quality of small firms in the United 
States. 
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The survey used in this study, the “Survey on Corporate Financial Environments” (SCFE) has 
been conducted annually by the Small and Medium Enterprise Agency (SMA) since 2001.    The SCFE 
asks firms various questions concerning their relationship with their main bank, which are comparable 
to questions asked of small firms in the United States by the Survey of Small Business Finances 
(SSBF).  Indeed, the SCFE, which tracks firms every survey year, is an improvement on the SSBF, 
which only surveys different firms every five years.    We match each surveyed firm with its main bank 
from the answers given to the 2002 survey of the SCFE, which asked respondent firms to name their 
main bank. 
We construct a dataset from the 2002 and 2003 surveys of the SCFE, which ask relevant questions.   
The SCFE asks respondent firms to provide answers to questionnaires as of October 31 of the 
respective survey year.  The financial data of surveyed firms are compiled by the Tokyo Shoko 
Research Corporation (TSR).  The data on firms’ main banks are compiled from various publicly 
available forms. 
In matching the SCFE survey data with data on main banks, the selected date on which the data on 
the main banks are recorded is March 31 of the survey year, the nearest closing date to the fiscal year 
for Japanese financial institutions.
15    Thus, the data from the 2002 and 2003 surveys of the SCFE are 
matched with the data of banks at the ends of fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2002, respectively.  
Likewise, the data on the surveyed firm from each survey of the SCFE are matched with the TSR 
financial data on the firm at the most recent closing date of the survey year.
16 
The qualitative data on surveyed firms such as the demographic characteristics of the firm’s 
representative and shareholder composition were collected by TSR in 2001.     
                                                   
15 Main banks of surveyed firms are not necessarily banks licensed under the Banking Act.  Other depository 
institutions include shinkin banks, credit cooperatives, government financial institutions, the Norinchukin Bank, and 
agricultural and fishery cooperatives. 
 
16  Unlike financial institutions, closing dates are scattered throughout the calendar year.     
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3.2. Sample Selection 
The numbers of firms surveyed in the 2002 and 2003 surveys of the SCFE were 7726 and 8846 
respectively.  Following  the  U.S.  definition of a small firm set by the Small Business Administration, 
firms that employ less than 500 persons and whose financial statements are available for both FY 2001 
and 2002 were selected.  After excluding those firms whose main bank is either a governmental 
financial institution or a cooperative, those firms whose information on the (short-term) borrowing rate 
from their main bank either in the 2002 or the 2003 survey of the SCFE is missing and those firms with 
missing information on the length of their relationship with their main bank and their industry, 1294 
firms remained.
17 
18    Furthermore, firms that reported that they switched their main banks zero, one or 
two years ago were dropped.  This ensures that for every firm in the sample a bank matched with a 
firm as a main bank was indeed the firm’s main bank as of March 2002, the most recent fiscal year end 
from October 2003 when the 2002 survey was carried out.
19  Only 1.6% of firms (21 firms) in the 
sample were dropped for this reason.    The number of remaining firms in the sample is 1273. 
Of the 1273 firms, firms with answers to various questionnaires concerning the firm’s relationship 
with its main bank, firms that failed to answer questions in the questionnaires concerning their 
relationship with their main bank, or concerning collateralization and public guarantees, or failed to 
give demographic information on their representative were dropped.  A very small number of firms 
who had not reported to their main bank neither in 2002 nor in 2003 were also excluded.  832 firms 
                                                   
17  Only 0.9% of surveyed firms have a cooperative as their main bank.     
 
18 5.6% and 7.5% of firms report that they did not have a main bank in the 2002 and 2003 surveys of the SCFE 
respectively.  Contract terms were surveyed only for loans borrowed from main banks.  Names of non-main banks 
that lend to surveyed firms are not identified.     
 
19 Main banks are reported only in October 2002.  “Two years ago” reported in October 2003 likely ranges from 
April 2001 (two-and-half years ago) to April 2002 (one-and-half years ago).    For some of these firms their main bank 
in March 2002 was quite likely different from the main bank they reported in October 2002.     
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remained in the two-year panel data.
20   
 
3.3. The Empirical Model 
We model a simultaneous system of equations for the lending rate and two of the important 
non-price terms, collateralization and credit guarantees as the following three-equation system.     
 
The first equation models the main bank’s decision to set the lending rate r.    The second and the 
third equations model the main bank’s decisions to request the borrowing firm to provide collateral on a 
loan and to request that the firm obtain credit guarantees from the government funded Credit Guarantee 
Corporations (CGCs), respectively.    Subscripts i, j, and t represent a firm, its main bank, and year.
21   
RELAT is a variable that is meant to measure the strength of the lender-borrower relationship.  
INFO is a vector of variables that are meant to measure either the firm’s transparency or availability of 
the firm’s recorded information.  BANK is a vector of variables that are meant to measure the main 
bank specific variables that include variables measuring the bank’s financial health.  RISK is a 
variable that is meant to measure the credit risk of the firm.  FIRM is a vector of firm specific 
variables that include the firm’s solvency and demographic variables.  IV
c and IV
g are sets of 
instrumental variables for collateralization and for credit guarantees from the CGCs, respectively. 
                                                   
20 Firms whose main bank is the Norinchukin Bank, a central institution of agricultural, forestry and fishery 
cooperatives are not included in the final sample of 832 firms.  We included these firms at the earlier stage of this 
project in our sample.    Including or excluding these firms did not alter the empirical results. 
 
21 Fees are possibly another “important” non-price “term.”  Fees have become increasingly an important source of 
income for Japanese banks.    In 2002 and 2003, however, unlike U.S. banks, fees were still less important to Japanese 
banks.    For regional and regional 2 banks that are the major main banks of our sample firms the ratio of non-interest 
income to gross operating profits is around 10%.   The ratio for large “major” banks (city, trust and long-term credit 
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More detailed explanations of endogenous and exogenous variables follow in order.    Definitions 
of these variables are also summarized in Table I. 
 
3.4. Endogenous and Exogenous Variables 
The interest rate on a loan 
Each survey of the SCFE asks respondents what is the highest short-tern borrowing rate offered by 
their main bank.    Use of the short-term rate with maturity of less than one year as a dependent variable, 
allows us to control for the maturity of the lending contract.    Figure 1 presents the distribution of short 




Collateralization and credit guarantees 
The indicator variable C is set to unity if the firm’s loans from their main bank are (partially) 
collateralized by physical assets or personal guarantees.    Another indicator variable G is set to unity if 
the firm’s loans from their main bank are (partially) guaranteed by the Credit Guarantee Corporations 
(CGCs).   
Survey questionnaires regarding collateralization and credit guarantees are not identical between 
the two surveys of the SCFE.   +In the 2002 survey of the SCFE only, respondent firms were directly 
asked whether they offered physical collateral or a personal security to their main bank, and whether 
they were using CGCs to guarantee loans received from their main bank.     
                                                   
22 The data on short-term rates are the only universally available figures for the borrowing rate.   However, the data 
on longer-term rates, which are most likely the rates on funds for financing the firm’s investment, may not be 
comparable across firms because maturities vary.  Since a main bank often rolls over short loans, a firm’s objective 
to borrow short is not necessarily just to finance short-term working capital but is often to finance longer term projects.   
Furthermore, the fact that a fixed collateral is usually established for a firm’s entire loan amount by its main bank 
suggests that the main bank most likely mixes long-term and short-term loans in a single basket in managing the 
borrower’s loans. 
 
23  In Figure 1, some firms are observed to borrow at rates below the prime rate.    According to a practitioner, banks 
lend to firms with a very low credit risk at rates below the prime rate. 
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In the 2003 survey of the SCFE, respondent firms were asked the total amount of short-term and 
long-term loans that they received from their main bank.
24    Then, they were asked the amount of loans 
from the main bank that was physically collateralized and the amount of loans guaranteed by the CGCs.   
In a separate questionnaire, they were asked whether or not they offered personal security to their main 
bank.    Regarding the data from the 2003 survey of the SCFE, C is set to be unity if either the amount 
of collateralized loans from the main bank is greater than zero or the firm is offering personal 
guarantees to the main bank.  Likewise, G is set to be unity if the amount of loans guaranteed by the 
CGCs is positive. 
 
The firm’s “transparency” (INFO) 
Variables included in INFO are the interaction term between the frequency of the firm’s reporting 
to its main bank (the reporting frequency in one year) and the dummy variable that is set to unity if the 
firm reports to its main bank voluntarily (DOCWILL is the interaction term of the frequency DOC and 
the dummy variable DOC_WILL), the number of board members (BOARD), and the dummy variable 
that is set to unity if the firm is owner-managed (OWNER).
25 
26 
DOCWILL rather than the frequency of reporting itself is used as it measures a firm’s willingness 
to report to its main bank and is exogenous to the bank’s setting of the lending rate.  Whether a firm 
reports at its will or not is based only on the questionnaire surveyed in the 2002 SCFE that asks a 
                                                   
24 There may be individual loan contracts between a firm and its lender bank that are neither even partially 
collateralized nor publicly guaranteed.  Should there be a default, though, what matters to the lender is not the 
recovery of each individual loan but the recovery of all the loans that the bank has supplied.    Thus, whether some of 
the loans from the main bank to the firm are collateralized or publicly guaranteed influences any lending rate 
including the highest short rate, the rate charged on one of multiple contracts between the bank and the firm that are 
not necessarily collateralized or publicly guaranteed. 
 
25  A firm is defined to be owner managed if the equity share of the firm’s representative and persons sharing the same 
last name with the representative exceeds 50%.  OWNER may capture the firm’s appetite for risk taking.  Indeed, 
the average credit score of owner managed firms is significantly larger than the average score of non owner managed 
firms. 
 
26  Since there are very few listed firms in the sample (1.5%), the dummy variable that is set to unity if the firm is 
listed in stock exchanges is not included.   15
respondent firm whether it reports to its main bank either “on a main bank’s request”, it reports to its 
main bank “at its own will”, or had not reported to its main bank at all during the one year period 
preceding the survey date.    A firm is assumed to have reported voluntarily in both 2002 and 2003 if its 
answer to this question is “at its own will”, since its reporting was voluntary at the initial stage.  
Owner-managed firms or firms with the small number of board members are less likely to leave 
recorded information.    FAGE is included since young start ups are little known to external creditors.     
 
The main bank’s financial health (BANK) 
Independent variables included in BANK are the book capital to asset ratio (BCAR), the dummy 
variable that is set to unity if the bank’s regulatory status is “international” (BBISCLASS), the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total asset (BNPL), the ratio of loan loss provisions to total asset (BLOSS), the 
ratio of liquid assets to total asset (BLIQUID), and a logarithm of total asset (LNBTASSET). 
The book-based capital to asset ratio is used because a bank can easily manipulate with the Basel 
regulatory capital to asset ratio.
27  “International” banks that are allowed to conduct international 
businesses need to meet a higher regulatory standard (8% for the Basel ratio) than “domestic” banks 
(4%).    BLIQUID is a ratio of liquid assets to total asset, a measure for the bank assets’ liquidity used 
by Kashyap and Stein (1999).    Liquid assets include cash, deposits, call loans and securities.
28   
 
The strength of lender-borrower relationship (RELAT) 
Relationship length between a firm and its main bank (LENGTH) is included as a measure of the 
                                                   
 
27  Ito and Sasaki (1999) discuss that Japanese banks issued subordinated debts and had their affiliate firms undertake 
subordinated debts when core capital became scarce.  Half of the capital to meet the regulatory standard should be 
core Tier 1 capital, which is roughly equivalent to book capital. 
 
28 Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) include the bank’s ROA as another “bank effect” variable.  We excluded the 
ROA since it is very strongly correlated with the short rate and we suspect a reverse causality (higher lending rates 
generate a higher ROA.).   16
strength of the lender-borrower relationship.   
29 
 
The firm’s credit risk (RISK) 
We include the credit score rated by TSR (SCORE).  The score ranges from 0 to 100. (A firm 
with a score of 100 is the safest.)  The score is based on the firm’s financial statements and a wide 
range of additional qualitative attributes.   
 
Firm specific variables (FIRM) 
Variables included in FIRM are the firm’s capital to asset ratio (CAPITAL) and various firm 
specific control variables.  Control variables are the logarithm of total assets (LNTASSET), the 
current ratio (the ratio of current assets to current liabilities, CURRENT), the logarithm of short 
borrowing (LNSHORT), age of the firm’s representative (AGE), a dummy variable that is set to unity if 
the firm’s representative owns residential housing (HOUSE), a dummy variable that is set to unity if 
the educational attainment of the firm’s representative is college educated or a graduate of a more 
advanced institution (EDUC), industry dummies and region dummies.
30  LNSHORT is included as a 
proxy for the quantity of a firm’s short-term loans from its main bank that is not directly observed.  
LNSHORT is treated as an endogenous variable. 
 
3.5. Instrumental Variables for Collateralization and Public Credit Guarantees 
                                                   
29 Berger and Udell (1995), Petersen and Rajan (2002) and Degryse and Ongena (2005) employ the length of the 
main bank firm relationship as a variable to measure the relationship strength in running the regression for the lending 
rate.  The recent work by Kano et al. (2006) and Uchida, Udell and Watanabe (2006 b) explore other candidate 
variables including the number of lenders and the scope of financial services that a firm receives from its main bank. 
 
 
30 Eight region dummies for Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kitakanto, Chubu, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu are 
included, but the dummy variable for Greater Tokyo is excluded as a variable for the base group.  Nine industry 
dummy variables for construction, information and communication, transportation, wholesale, retail, real estate, 
services, and other industries are included, but a dummy variable for the manufacturing industry is excluded as a 
variable for the base group.   17
Instrumental variables for the indicator variable for collateralization, C, are the share of 
immovables within the total asset (ESTATE), interaction terms of the share of immovable assets with 
region dummies and industry dummies and the share of movables within the total assets (MOVABLE).   
These variables are used because firms that are rich in collateralizable assets such as real estates have 
the ability to pledge collateral and therefore are more willing to offer it to their main bank.
31  
Interaction terms with region dummies are meant to capture variations in land prices across regions.  
Interaction terms with industry dummies are meant to capture variations in the importance of 
immovables across industries. 
The instrumental variable for the indicator variable for public credit guarantees, G, is a dummy 
variable that is set to unity if the firm is eligible to apply for credit guarantees to CGCs (GELIGIBLE).   
Firms that are eligible to apply for public credit guarantees from CGCs are “small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs)” as defined by the SMA.  The trick in constructing this instrumental variable is 
that firms selected in the sample are “small” firms defined by the simpler US standard, which do not 




3.6. The Instrumental Variable Regression 
We run the standard instrumental variable regression (two-stage least squares, 2SLS) for the 
lending rate using all the exogenous variables included in the equation for the lending rate and 
instrumental variables for collateralization and public credit guarantees mentioned just above as a set of 
                                                   
 
31  Farinha and Santos (2002) use the ratio of immovables to total debt as a proxy for a firm’s ability to pledge 
collateral when running regressions for the number of lender banks.   
 
32 It is well known that consistency of estimates on coefficients in the linear regression equation with endogenous 
dummy independent variables holds as long as selected instrumental variables are exogenous and correlated with 
endogenous dummy variables.    We added the logarithm of firm sales as an instrumental variable for LNSHORT.   18
instrumental variables.




4.1. Preliminary Results 
Summary statistics 
Table III shows summary statistics of variables used in this study.   The median and the mean of 
the number of employees are 50 and 83 respectively.
34  Average sales are 3,992 million yen.  The 
average short rate is 2.05%.  Ninety-two percent of firms in the sample pledged collateral to their 
main bank, whereas 51% of firms obtained public guarantees from the CGCs to get loans from their 
main bank.    The main banks of 61% of firms are regional or regional 2 banks.    Twenty-nine percent 
and nine percent of firms use large nation-wide banks (city banks or trust banks) and shinkin banks as 
their main bank respectively.
35    The average length of the relationships with a main bank is 36 years.   
Ninety-five percent of firms are eligible for public credit guarantees.  We do not utilize the panel 
structure of the data in the following regression analyses since there are little dynamic variations in 
many variables including the three endogenous variables over the two-year sample period.
36 
 
                                                   
 
33  Linear regressions of endogenous dummy variables on instrumental variables are run at the first stage of the 2SLS 
regression.  The predicted probabilities for collateralization and public credit guarantees, which are then used as 
independent variables for the second stage linear regression for the lending rate, may be less than zero or greater than 
one.  Such “invalid” predicted values for probabilities do not bias estimates of coefficients in the equation for the 
lending rate. 
 
34  Japanese firms surveyed in the SCFE are relatively larger than American firms surveyed in the SSBF.    The median 
and the mean for firms surveyed in the 1998 survey of the SSVF are 3 and 23 respectively. 
 
35  Shinkin banks are small credit associations (Speigel and Yamori [2004]).     
 
36  The short rate barely changes over the sample period since the prime rate, the bottom line of the rate, stays the 
same at 1.375%.     
   19
The first stage 
Tables IV. Panels A and B present the results of the first stage OLS regressions for collateralization 
and public credit guarantees, respectively.     
The estimated coefficient of ESTATE is positive and statistically significant in the equation for 
collateralization regardless of whether the interaction terms between ESTATE and region and industry 
dummies (column 1) are included (column 2).  Likewise, the estimated coefficient of GELIGIBLE is 
positive and significant in the equation for public credit guarantees regardless of the inclusion of 
interaction terms.    These strong results validate our choice of instruments.    The model fit is improved 
when interaction terms are included in both first stage regressions. 
 
4.2. Results 
Table V presents the regression results for the equation for the main bank’s lending rate.  The 
following discussion is mainly based on the 2SLS regression results reported in the first column.    The 
second column presents the 2SLS regression results when G (public credit guarantees) is treated as an 
exogenous variable, whereas the third column presents the simple OLS regression results. 
 
The firm’s “transparency” (INFO) 
All coefficients of variables are estimated to be statistically insignificant.  Such results are a 
sharp contrast to Berger and Udell (1995) who find that more transparent firms, such as incorporated 
firms and non-owner managed firms, enjoy lower borrowing rates than opaque firms, such as 
unincorporated firms and owner managed firms.     
There are possibly two explanations for our results’ departure from that of Berger and Udell.  
One explanation is that in shorter bank-firm relationships in the U.S., transparency is a matter of great 
importance to banks.  Another explanation is that Berger and Udell’s estimates may be biased due to   20
endogeneity of non-price terms.    We will return to this endogeneity problem shortly. 
It is worth mentioning that the coefficient of DOCWILL is positive, though insignificant.  This 
might suggest that high risk firms are willing to report more often to their main bank to get loans even 
if not request by the bank.     
 
The main bank’s financial health (BANK) 
The coefficient of BNPL is positive and statistically significant at the 5% significance level.  
Financially distressed banks suffering from a large amount of non-performing loans relative to total 
asset force borrowing firms to share the costs of writing off non-performing loans by charging higher 
interest  rates.   
 
Collateralization 
The estimated coefficient of C (collateralization) is not significant.  One way to interpret this 
result is that Japanese banks do not properly price voluntarily pledged collateral.  Is this a valid 
interpretation?    Answers to this question will be discussed in the next sub section.
37 
 
Public credit guarantees 
The estimated coefficient of G (public credit guarantees) is positive but not statistically significant.   
We save the interpretation of this result for the next sub section. 
                                                   
37  A firm that voluntarily offers collateral to its main bank should send a signal to the bank that it is a safer firm.    If 
so, the bank should reduce the lending rate to this safer firm.  If this theory holds true in the real world, the 
coefficient of collateral should be negative.  Another way to interpret the variable C is that it captures the firm’s 
collateral value.  This is a valid argument since C is instrumented by the share of immovables in the firm’s assets.  
In the latter interpretation of C, its coefficient is again theoretically negative.  The fact that the coefficient of the 
firm’s capital to asset ratio is positive and the coefficient of C is statistically insignificant may suggest that both C and 
the firm’s capital to asset ratio capture the firm’s collateral value.   To test this hypothesis, we dropped the capital to 
asset ratio as an independent variable so as to examine whether the coefficient of C turns negative and significant.  
The coefficient of C, however, remained insignificant. 
   21
 
The importance of the simultaneity bias due to non-price terms 
Ignoring endogeneity due to non-price terms would seriously bias the estimation of the main 
bank’s pricing behavior.    The estimated equation for the lending rate when non-price terms are treated 
as exogenous variables is implausible in many regards.    The coefficients of DOCWILL (the frequency 
of reporting to a main bank when a firm’s report is voluntary) and FAGE (firm age) are positive and 
statistically significant and the coefficients of C (collateralization) and G (public credit guarantees) are 
positive and significant.    The positive estimates of the coefficients of C and G on the third column of 
Table V suggest that banks require riskier firms to collateralize loans or to have loans secured by public 
credit guarantees.
 38     
 
The strength of lender-borrower relationship (RELAT) 
The estimated coefficient of LENGTH is not statistically significant.  This is not necessarily 
inconsistent with Berger and Udell (1995) who found that the coefficient of the length of the 
relationship is negative because they impose a maximum limit of 30 years on the relationship duration.   
In contrast, the average relationship duration in our sample is 36 years. 
 
A firm’s credit risk (RISK) 
The risks embedded in firms are properly priced as the coefficient of SCORE is estimated to be 
negative and statistically significant. 
 
Firm specific variables (FIRM) 
                                                   
38 An augmented regression test suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993) rejects a joint hypothesis that C, G 
and LNSHORT are all exogenous (F(3,1620)=2.61, p value = 0.050) but does not reject a joint hypothesis that C and 
G are both exogenous (F(2, 1620) = 0.41. The p value = 0.666).  This does not necessarily mean C and G are 
exogenous.    One of the possible causes for the rejection of the joint hypothesis is an inadequate explanatory power of 
instrumental variables.    We will return to this issue later.   22
    The negative and significant coefficients of CAPITAL and LNTASSET support the view that a 
high collateral value of a firm reduces the cost of borrowing.  Main banks (relationship lenders) do 
utilize financial statements.  Is relationship lending merely a title and financial statement 
(transactions-based) lending in practice?  Many practitioners contend that the essence of a firm-bank 
relationship is to help small firms prepare more reliable financial statements.  To do so, main banks 
utilize relationship specific information about the firms. 
 
4.3. Further Evidence on Non-price Terms of Contract 
    In the benchmark results, neither security by collateral nor security by public credit guarantees 
seems to be priced on lending rates set by the main banks.  They even seem to set a premium for 
secured loans relative to unsecured loans.    Do main banks really ignore security in pricing loans?    In 
this sub section, we will provide alternative interpretations of benchmark results.     
 
Collateralization 
        Why do main banks not seem to price collateral?
39    According to the former bank examiner at the 
Bank of Japan, in the second half of 2003, banks switched from loan by loan management based on 
collateral to management of pooled loans.  This fact, however, does not seem to contribute to an 
insignificant coefficient of C.  The coefficient stays insignificant when the sample date is limited to 
2002 (Results are not reported).     
                                                   
 
39 According to Table 4-1, the F statistic for excluded instrumental variables is 9.29 for the endogenous variable C 
(collateralization), suggesting that employed instruments may not be strong enough (their correlation with C may not 
be strong enough).  So we need to be cautious when interpreting the coefficient of C.  Weak instruments tend to 
cause larger estimated standard errors for endogenous variables.  The threshold for the first stage F statistic at 10 is 
suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997) for a case of a single endogenous variable.  Various other test statistics have 
been recently proposed, but so far there is little consensus on standard tests for empirical use.  The F statistic does 
not increase either when the logarithm of short borrowing (LNSHORT), an endogenous variable other than non-price 
terms, is dropped or when total loan to total debt ratio, the instrument employed by Bharath et al (2006), is added as 
an additional instrumental variable.   23
The 2002 round of the SCFE asked firms to give a self assessment of the value of collateral they 
pledged to their main bank relative to the amount of loans outstanding borrowed from the main bank.  
If they pledged collateral to their main bank, firms were asked to choose from five alternatives, “(the 
value of collateral is) substantially less than the amount of loans outstanding”, “slightly less than the 
amount of loans outstanding”, “about the same as the amount of loans outstanding”, “slightly greater 
than the amount of loans outstanding” and “substantially greater than the amount of loans outstanding”.   
As shown in Table VI. Panel A, interest rates on uncollateralized loans are far lower than on 
collateralized loans, and rates on collateralized loans tend to increase with the degree of collateral 
coverage.
40 
41   
    Do banks price the degree of collateral coverage while only allowing safe firms to borrow 
uncollateralized loans?  The coefficient of the extent of collateral coverage, when added to 
endogenous variables, is not significant.  The dummy variable that indicates whether a firm pledges 
collateral to the main bank (C) is not significant, either. (column1, Table VII)
42   
Indeed, banks seem not to directly price security by collateral.  Banks are doing so indirectly 
through pricing credit scores (as indicated from a negative and significant coefficient of credit score).  
As shown in Table VI. Panel A, firms exempt from pledging collateral to their main bank score the 
highest, while, for firms pledging some collateral to their main bank, credit scores tend to increase with 
the extent of collateral coverage.  It is worth mentioning that in practice independent research houses 
                                                   
 
40 Firms that answered that they pledgeed collateral to their main bank but did not answer the question concerning 
collateral coverage are dropped in Table 6. 
 
41  Firms that do not pledge collateral to their main bank, however, are those whose performance is generally good but 
hold less real estate relative to their total asset.    The average size of such firms, which hire on average slightly more 
employees than firms in the entire sample (97 persons versus 81 persons), triples the average size of all firms in the 
sample both in sales and total asset.  These firms are also better capitalized and earn higher credit scores.  Thus, 
many firms who did not pledge collateral to their main bank were most likely exempted, though they may have had 
been quite prepared to offer collateral. 
 
42  In converting a survey question to an independent variable that measures collateral coverage, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25 and 
1.5 are assigned to “substantially less”, “slightly less”, “about the same”, “slightly greater” and “substantially greater”, 
respectively.   24
(Tokyo Shoko Research in our case) do weigh in the extent of collateral coverage when scoring firms’ 
credit  quality.   
 
Public credit guarantees 
    Although it is not statistically significant, the magnitude (55 basis points) of a positive and 
significant coefficient of G are partially secured by public credit guarantees is counterintuitive.    Loan 
security by public credit guarantees is not only priced, but banks likely penalize firms for securing 
loans.  This straightforward interpretation of the result is not persuasive.  Another explanation is 
that firms that borrow with public credit guarantees are generally riskier firms.  Row 2 of Table VI. 
Panel B supports this view.    The average credit score increases with the extent of the CGC coverage. 
Is there any alternative interpretation?     
Indeed, the positive estimate could be consistent with a firm’s incentive structure in the presence 
of fees for guarantees.  A fee paid to the CGC for its guarantee is expensive in the low interest rate 
environment.    The standard fee is 1.35% of the outstanding loan amount.    Thus, if a firm is confident 
in its ability to repay a loan to a bank on time, it would not obtain the CGC’s guarantee at the cost of a 
fee.  In other words, firms that are willing to obtain guarantees are riskier firms rather than safer 
firms.
43    Safer firms may send a positive signal to their main bank by offering collateral, but may not 
bother to bear the cost of a fee in order to simply send a positive signal.    Banks in return raise interest 
rates on loans to firms willing to obtain the CGC’s guarantees.     
    There is a certain data limitation related to the issue discussed above.  Remember that a firm is 
asked to report the highest of short interest rates on loans borrowed from its main bank.
44  The  highest 
                                                   
 
43 Main banks may reduce lending rates to transparent firms that obtain the CGC guarantees but may maintain 
lending rates to opaque firms that obtain CGC guarantees.  This hypothesis, however, is not empirically supported 
since when interaction terms of transparency measures with G are included as independent variables, their coefficients 
are not statistically significant.     
 
44 Firms may report the interest rate including a fee rate (the ratio of a fee to the amount outstanding) by mistake   25
interest rate for a firm is unlikely to be for one on a loan secured by CGC’s guarantee unless loans 
borrowed from the main bank are fully covered by guarantees.  All things being equal, greater CGC 
coverage of loans to a firm makes an unsecured loan to that firm less susceptible to default as they are 
relaxed debt burdens.  Nonetheless the inherent risk of a firm selecting to be dependent on public 
credit guarantees may more than offset reduction in credit risk due to greater security given by 
increased CGC coverage.     
    How would the results change if interest rates on secured loans were available?  We conjecture 
that the coefficient of G would be smaller but would not become negative.  Why can we say this?  
According to the survey conducted by the Japan Small and Medium Enterprise Corporation (present the 
Organization for Small & Medium Enterprises and Regional Innovation, Japan) in June 2004, on 
average, banks discount an interest rate on a loan to a firm secured by the CGC’s guarantee relative to 
unsecured loan to that firm by 49 basis points.    Given this fact, based on row 1 of Table 6-2, average 
interest rates on secured loans are estimated to be 1.92%, 2.19%, 2.24% and 3.17% by ascending order 
with respect to CGC coverage. (Recall that the interest rate for the highest bracket does not have the 
average rate of discount subtracted because rates reported in this bracket are rates on perfectly secured 
loans).  The amount of 1.92% for secured loans in the lowest bracket (more than 0% but less than 
40%) is higher than the 1.59% charged to firms without the CGC coverage, suggesting that banks treat 
secured loans to risky firms with lower credit score less favorably than unsecured loans to safe firms 
with higher score.  This may indicate that the variable G could pick up the firm’s credit risk that the 
credit score fails to capture.     
Alternatively, according to a government sector economist who has frequent contact with Japanese 
bankers, main banks likely force firms that can borrow only with CGC’s guarantees to accept higher 
                                                                                                                                                                                
since in practice fees are paid to the CGC through a lender bank acting as a middleman between the borrowing firm 
and the CGC and the firms may perceive the total cost of borrowing including the fees, as interest payments.  This 
could be a source of the overestimation of the coefficient of G.  According to practitioners though, firms are less 
likely to add the fee rate to the interest rate since banks inform firms of the interest rate and the fee rate separately.   26
lending rates.  If this is the case, the positive coefficient of G is another evidence of main banks’ 
exploitation of opaque small firms. 
 
4.4. Main Bank Dependence and Lending Rates 
Do competition with non main-bank lenders push down the main bank’s lending rate? 
        According to a private sector consultant on pricing of bank loans, a Japanese bank first computes 
the benchmark lending rate for each contract based on hard information, primarily financial statements, 
and then sets the contractual rate somewhere between the prime rate and the benchmark based on soft 
information gathered through an established relationship with the borrowing firm and the competitive 
environment the bank faces.     
We are wondering then whether main banks discount lending rates when they are under 
competitive pressures from competing lenders.  The SCFE asks a firm the number of banks the firm 
has had “transactions“ with by bank type and then asks the firm the balance of loans from banks of that 
type.  Unfortunately the data on these variables are unreliable.  Apparently, some respondent firms 
reported the number of banks they had “some” transactions with (deposit accounts, etc), whereas others 
reported the number of banks from whom they borrowed.    Many firms reported a positive number for 
the number of banks of a certain bank type with whom they have “transactions” and then answered 
zero to the question pertaining to the balance of loans from banks of that type.  As a result, the 
maximum number reported for the number of banks is 69!  Because of the dubious data reliability of 
the data, we decided not to use these variables.
45    Unfortunately, measures showing the concentration 
of local bank lending markets are not available. 
Since data on interest rates set (offered) by non-main bank lenders are not available, we cannot tell 
whether the interest rate set by the main bank is higher or lower than rates set by non-main bank 
                                                   
 
45 We experimented with various ways to include “the number of banks”, but results changed with every attempt.  
We believe these failed regression attempts are due to “noise” on this variable.   27
lenders.  Thus, the discussion is highly speculative.  As we see from the benchmark results, main 
banks force relationship borrowers to bear the cost of the banks’ financial distress.    On the other hand, 
firms rarely switch main banks (Only 17% of firms surveyed in the 2003 SCFE survey reported that 
they had ever switched main banks).  This implicates that opacity of small firms is too severe for 
non-main banks to set credit terms competitive with main banks.
46  This fact contrasts with 
experiences of large Japanese keiretsu firms.  Using data of large manufacturing firms in Japan, 
Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) found that firms with a main bank pay larger debt repayments relative to 
their entire debts than firms without.  Since such large firms were sufficiently transparent, the main 
banks’ relationships no longer improved credit terms.  The fact that large firms eventually did leave 
main banks for unintermediated credit markets shows that these firms were not “locked in” to their 
relationships.   
 
Are smaller firms more exploited by main banks? 
    Relative to the US SSBF data, our SCFE data include larger firms.  Larger firms are less 
dependent on a single main bank and can diversify financing sources, while small firms tend to be 
dependent on their main bank.
47 
48  Bank effects on lending rates should emerge if a borrowing firm 
is dependent on a single (main) bank and the bank is not under competitive pressures from non-main 
bank lenders.  If this scenario holds true, bank effects are stronger for smaller firms than for larger 
firms.   
To test this hypothesis, we ran the regression for a sample of smaller firms with less than 50 
                                                   
46 Less than 10% of firms in our sample borrow only from their main bank.  Firms borrow from non-main banks 
under tighter terms perhaps because they insure against unexpected liquidity needs. 
 
47 The average main bank’s share in loans is 54% for small firms with less than 50 employees, whereas the average 
main bank’s share in loans for large firms with no less than 50 employees is 46%. 
 
48  Regressions for sub samples of firms with a higher dependence on their main bank for loans and firms with a lower 
dependence did not produce plausible estimates due to the small sample size.   28
employees.  As expected, the estimated coefficient of BNPL (the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total asset) is much larger than that of the baseline sample and is statistically significant at the one 
percent level (column 2, Table VII).    If BNPL increases by five percentage points, the lending rates to 
the bank’s small borrowers rise by 27 basis points on average based on this estimate.
49  This 
magnitude is not negligible in the super low interest rate environment.
50 
51    In addition, the coefficient 
of G is significant at the 1% level and much larger (85 basis points) than the coefficient for the baseline 
sample.  These two findings jointly reinforce the hypothesis that small firms are greatly exploited by 
their main banks.  On the contrary, the coefficient of BNPL is not significant for larger firms with at 
least 50 employees, though a large J statistic reduces the reliability of the resultse (column 3, Table 
VII). 
 
4.5. Does the Length of the Relationship Really Not Matter? 
        Our baseline results suggest that, in very long and established main bank relationships, a marginal 
increase in the length of the relationship is of little importance.    This implication does not necessarily 
rule out the possibility that the length of the relationship may matter to certain subgroups of firms.  
Our baseline results simply refer to the average situation of firms in the sample.     
 
The non-linear relationship between the length of the relationship and the lending rate 
The length of the relationship length may matter more to firms at the beginning of the relationship 
                                                   
49 The average short rate and the average ratio of non-performing loans to total asset is 2.338% and 0.0531, 
respectively. 
 
50 Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002) find a larger bank effect using the U.S. data from 1987 to 1992.    During their 
sample period, the federal funds rate moved from 2.92% to 6.43%.    During our sample period, the overnight call rate 
was virtually 0%. 
 
51  The F statistic for excluded instruments is 9.72 for C, suggesting that the reported standard error for the coefficient 
of C is less likely to be biased.  Limiting the sample to small firms, on the other hand, invalidates the key 
instrumental variable for public credit guarantees, GELIGIBLE, which indicates whether a firm is eligible to apply for 
public credit guarantees, since small firms with less than 50 employees are all eligible for public credit guarantees.       29
than to firms with a mature relationship.  That is, the marginal increase in the length of the 
relationship could be much more important at the beginning of the relationship than at the later stage 
when the relationship is well established.    The benchmark results, however, remain virtually the same 
when LENGTH is given the logarithm (LNLENGTH).  The effect of relationship duration remains 
negligible (Model 1 of Table 8).
52 
 
Credit score and the length of the relationship 
    Banks may care more about relationships with riskier firms more than with safer firms.  To 
examine this hypothesis, we ran the regression with an interaction term of credit score and the length of 
the relationship.    The coefficient of the interaction term indeed is negative and statistically significant 
while the coefficient of relationship duration turns positive and significant (Model 2 of Table VIII).  
Does this finding really support the hypothesis?    The credit score ranges from 25 to 80.    For 90% of 
firms (excluding the top and bottom five percentiles), which are squeezed in a narrow band with credit 
scores from 48 to 68, the magnitude of the coefficient of the length of the relationship is negligible.     
 
A firm’s transparency and the length of the relationship 
        A bank may care more about its borrower’s transparency (to outsiders as well as to the bank) when 
the bank’s relationship with the firm is still immature.  To examine this hypothesis, we explored the 
regression with interaction terms of the length of the relationship and transparency measures 
(DOCWILL, BOARD and OWNER) as additional independent variables.
53  Two interaction terms 
                                                   
 
52  We attempted regressions using a sample of firms whose relationship with their main bank is shorter (less than 10 
years/ less than 20 years), but the results were implausible due to lack of sample size.    We made yet another attempt 
to capture nonlinearity of the length of the relationship by including dummy variables indicating quartiles of 
relationship length, but none of these dummy variables were statistically significant.    These results are not reported. 
 
53  The interaction term with FAGE was not included since FAGE is strongly correlated with the length of the 
relationship, and therefore the interaction term may merely capture the non-linearity of the length of the relationship.   30
carry statistically significant coefficients (Model 3 of Table VIII).  The negative coefficient of an 
interaction term with DOCWILL and the magnitude of the positive coefficient of DOCWILL imply 
that frequent voluntary reporting by a firm with a short main bank relationship is a negative signal to a 
main bank, but that frequency of voluntary reporting by many firms with long and established 
relationships is not a bank’s major concern.  The magnitude of the positive coefficient of an 
interaction term with BOARD and a positive but insignificant coefficient of BOARD suggest that the 
number of board members does not matter to a main bank’s pricing of loans except when a main bank 
relationship is of extremely long duration.     
 
“Bank effects” and the length of the relationship 
    Exploiting stronger relationships, financially weaker main banks may charge higher lending rates 
to firms with longer relationships.    When added, the interaction term between LENGTH and BNPL is 
indeed negative and weakly significant (the results are not reported).    When, then, the interaction term 
between firm age and BNPL is added, neither of the coefficients of interaction terms is significant (the 
results are not reported).  The negative coefficient of the interaction term between LENGTH and 
BNPL most likely emerged spuriously due to the correlation of LENGTH and FAGE. 
 
Distance as another measure for the relationship strength 
    Referring to the importance of distance between a lender and a borrower in relationship lending 
Petersen and Rajan (2002) discuss, “If ... much of this information is soft and difficult to communicate, 
the decision to offer credit has to be made very close to where the information is gathered.”  
Information accumulated in a bank over the long course of relationship could be richer about firms 
located closer to the bank than those located farther.    When the measure for distance (DISTANCE) is   31
added, its coefficient is indeed positive (Model 4 of Table VIII).
54    This implies either that banks value 
richer information gathered through frequent contacts that the geographic proximity allows or that 
communication (or transportation) costs due to a longer distance are incorporated in lending rates. 
 
4.6. Robustness Checks 
In this sub section, we conduct further robustness tests.  To overview, our benchmark 2SLS 
results from Table V are mostly robust.    The results of these robustness checks are presented in Table 
9 with the benchmark results from Table 5 reappearing for the purpose of comparison (Model 1). 
 
Use of the estimated short borrowing from the firm’s main bank as an independent variable 
In the benchmark regression, we used the quantity of all short-term loans borrowed by a firm 
rather than the quantity of short-term loans borrowed from the firm’s main bank as an independent 
variable.    We estimated the amount of short-term loans that a firm borrows from its main bank, which 
in itself is not available in either round of the SCFE.  The amount of total loans that firms borrowed 
from their main bank is surveyed only in the 2003 survey.    Multiplying the amount of total loans from 
a firm’s main bank in the 2003 survey of the SCFE by the share of the firm’s short-term loans within its 
firm’s total loans in FY 2003 produces our estimate of the amount of short-term loans a firm borrowed 
from its main bank in (FY) 2003. 
Our baseline results remain unchanged when LNSHORT is replaced by LNSHORT_MAIN (the 
logarithm of the estimated short-term loans from the firm’s main bank) (Model 2 of Table IX).  The 
coefficient of LNSHORT_MAIN itself is not statistically significant, which is consistent with the 
findings of Hubbard, Kuttner and Palia (2002): that the facility size of a contract is of little relevance to 
                                                   
54  DISTANCE is constructed based on the question that asks firms to choose from six alternatives “less 500 meters”, 
“greater than 500 meters and less than 1 kilometers”, “greater than 1 kilometers and less than 10 kilometers”, “greater 
than 10 kilometers and less than 30 kilometers”, “greater than 30 kilometers and less than 50 kilometers” and “greater 
than 50 kilometers” fro the distance from a firm to a branch of its main bank that the firm deals with.  In the 
regression, these alternatives are replaced with values of 0.5 (kilometers), .75, 5.5, 20, 40 and 75 in order.     32
the lending rate.     
 
A set of instrumental variables without interaction terms 
    As shown in Table IV. Panwel A, when interaction terms are excluded from a set of instrumental 
variables, the F statistic for excluded instruments “happens” to be very large (34.16).
55  W i t h  t h e  
smaller but “strong” set of instruments excluding interaction terms, the results are mostly the same 
qualitatively as the baseline results (the third column of Table IX).     
 
Audited financial statements 
    Main banks may trust audited financial statements.  To test this hypothesis, we constructed a 
variable AUDIT that is set to unity if a firm’s financial statements are either audited by certified public 
accountants or verified by licensed tax accountants and included this variable as well as interaction 
terms of AUDIT and financial statement based variables (CAPITAL, TASSET, CURRENT).  The 
coefficient of AUDIT itself is negative but insignificant, and none of these interaction terms is 




5. Policy Implications 
5.1. Prudential Policy Implications 
Our finding that more financially distressed banks charge higher rates to small borrowing firms 
suggests that helping banks to write off non-performing loans with public capital would relax 
                                                   
 
55 Additionally, we replaced ESTATE (the ratio of immovables to total asset) with the ratio of immovables to total 
debt, which is used by Farinha and Santos (2002) and re-estimated the short rate, but the results remained qualitatively 
the same as the baseline results (Results are not reported).  We also included a lagged ROA of a main bank as an 
additional independent variable, but its coefficient was not significant. 
 
56  AUDIT is also used in Kano et al (2006) and Uchida, Udell and Watanabe (2006 a).   33
borrowing conditions faced by small firms dependent on their main bank.    In the same spirit, the super 
expansionary monetary policy in Japan during a “lost decade” did not have much of the desired real 
effects partly because, due to poor bank health (and perhaps inadequate public bail out program for 
banks), the borrowing costs of a large number of bank-dependent firms were not reduced as much as 
those with “unintermediated” borrowing.   
We estimated the short rate for firms borrowing from a main bank with a larger BNPL (no less 
than 0.06).  The estimated coefficient of BNPL is more than twice that of the baseline coefficient 
(results are not reported)
57.  Banks suffering from relatively large non-performing loans exhibited 
greater “bank effects” partly because they were under more intensive regulatory pressure.  This 
finding is in line with Peek and Rosengren’s (1995) finding that banks under formal regulatory action 
reduced lending while those who were not did not during the 1990-1991 period. 
Banks were under unusually strong regulatory pressure to write off non-performing loans and, as a 
result, “bank effects” were probably larger during our sample period than earlier when pressures were 
low.  On October 30, 2002, the Financial Services Agency announced the “Program for Financial 
Revival”.    The “Program” requested banks to “terminate” the non-performing loans problem “towards 
FY 2004”.     
 
5.2. Disclosure Policy Implications 
Encouraging small firms to disclose more reliable financial statements would not improve their 
borrowing conditions with their main banks even though with which they had had very long business 
relationships.    Such a policy, however, would encourage small firms to depend less on their main bank 
and allow other creditors, who have not previously had a relationship with a firm to offer their services.   
Rents appropriated by linked to their financial distress would gradually disappear, and small firms 
                                                   
 
57  We decided not to report the results since the associating J statistic was too small   34
would be able to borrow cheaply in more competitive credit markets, whether intermediated or not.
58   
 
5.3. Other Policy Implications 
Our empirical results show that a firm’s balance sheet strength such as capital to asset ratio 
(leverage ratio), total asset and collateral coverage are directly or indirectly reflected in the lending 
rates.    The “external finance premium” discussed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989. 1995) and Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1996, 1999) appears to be inversely related to the firm’s collateral value, which 





In this paper, we conducted a comprehensive examination of how relationship lenders price loans 
to small opaque firms. 
Use of data from the Survey on Corporate Financial Environments (SCFE) allowed us to match 
the data on borrowers with the data on their main banks.    Using data from the SCFE’s 2002 and 2003 
surveys, we ran regressions of the lending rate of a loan to a firm from its main bank on various factors 
after controlling for a firm’s demographic characteristics.  Such factors include the strength of the 
lender-borrower relationship, the firm’s transparency to outsiders, the borrowing firm’s transparency to 
their main bank, the main bank’s financial health, a firm’s financial health and the non-price terms of 
contract such as collateralization and public credit guarantees. 
Use of instrumental variables allowed us to avoid biases due to endogenous non-price terms 
                                                   
 
58 Our empirical findings ensure coherency of the current policy framework undertaken by the Japanese Small and 
Medium Enterprise Agency (SMA).  The SMA’s recent policy regarding the SME finances is twofold: 1 to set up 
more rigorous accounting standards: and 2 to encourage SMEs to utilize less traditional financial instruments such as 
asset backed securities and financial scoring loans.   35
(collateralization and public credit guarantees) and to obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients in 
the equation for the lending rate.     
We found that: 1. Neither measures for a borrower firm’s transparency to the public (outsiders) nor 
measures for the firm’s transparency to its main bank affect the lending rate.  2. A financially 
distressed main bank that suffers from greater non-performing loans charges a higher lending rate, 
supporting the view that main banks take advantage of their stronger bargaining position when in 
negotiations with their borrowing firms in a less competitive environment.  3. Treating non-price 
terms of a loan contract to be endogenous is crucial in consistently estimating a main bank’s pricing of 
loans. 
   36
References 
 
Bank of Japan, 2007, Financial System Report, March 2007, available at 
http://www.boj.or.jp/en/type/ronbun/fsr/fsr07a.pdf 
 
Berger, Allen N., Nathan H. Miller, Mitchell A. Petersen, Raghram G. Rajan and Jeremy C. Stein, 2005, 
Does Function Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small 
Firms, Journal of Financial Economics, 76 (2), 237-69. 
 
Berger, Allen N. and Gregory F. Udell, 1990, Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 25 (1), 505-529. 
 
Berger, Allen N. and Gregory F. Udell, 1995, Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small 
Business Finance, Journal of Business, 68 (3), 351-381. 
 
Berger, Allen N. and Gregory F. Udell, 2002, Small Business Credit Availability and Relationship 
Lending: the Importance of Bank Organizational Structure, Economic Journal, 112 (477), F32-F53. 
 
Berger, Allen N. and Gregory F. Udell, 2006, A More Complete Conceptual Framework for SME 
Finance, Journal of Banking and Finance, 30 (11), 2945-66. 
 
Bernanke, Ben S. and Mark Gertler, 1989, Agency-Costs, Net Worth and Business Fluctuations, 
American Economic Review, 79(1), 14-31. 
 
Bernanke, Ben S. and Mark Gertler, 1995, Inside the Black Box: the Credit Channel of Monetary 
Policy Transmission, Journal of Economic Perspective, 9(4), 27-48. 
 
Bernanke, Ben S., Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist, 1996, The Financial Accelerator and the Flight to 
Quality, in John Taylor and Michael Woodford, ed.: Handbook of Macroeconomics, Ch 21, vol 1C, 
1341-93. 
 
Bernanke, Ben S., Mark Gertler, and Simon Gilchrist, 1999, The Financial Accelerator in a Quantitative 
Business Cycle Framework, Review of Economics and Statistics, 78 (1), 1-15. 
 
Bharath Sreedhar, Sandeep Dahiya, Anthony Saunders and Anand Srinivasan, 2006, Lending 
Relationships and Loan Contract Terms: Does Size Matter? presented at the conference, “Corporate 
Finance of Financial Intermediaries” held at the Wharton School of University of Pennsylvania.   37
 
 
Booth, James R. and Lena Chua Booth, 2006, Loan Collateral Decisions and
59 Corporate Borrowing 
Costs, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 38 (1), 63-90. 
 
Brick, Ivan E. and Darius Palia, 2007, Evidence of Jointness in the Terms of Relationship Lending, 
Journal of Financial Intermediation, 16 (3): 452-76. 
 
Cole Rebel A. 1998, The Importance of Relationships to the Availability of Credit, Journal of Banking 
and Finance, 22, 959-977. 
 
Cressy, Robert and Otto Toivanen, 2001, Is There Adverse Selection in the Credit Market? Venture 
Capital, 3 (3), 215-238. 
 
Davidson, Russell and James G. MacKinnon, 1993, Estimation and Inference in Econometrics, (Oxford 
University Press). 
 
Diamond, Douglas W. and Raghuram G. Rajan, 2000, A Theory of Bank Capital, Journal of Finance, 
55 (6), 2431-65. 
 
Elsas Ralf and Jean Pieter Krahnen, 1998, Is Relationship Lending Special? Evidence from Credit-file 
Data in Germany, Journal of Banking and Finance, 22(10-11), 1283-1316. 
 
Farinha, Luisa A. and Joao Santos, 2002, Switching from Single to Multiple Bank Lending 
Relationships: Determinants and Implications, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 11 (2), 124-51. 
 
Gibson Michael S., 1995, Can Bank Health Affect Investment? Evidence from Japan, Journal of 
Business 68 (3): 281-308. 
 
Greenabum, Stuart I., George Kanaats and Venezia Ithbak, 1989, Equilibrium Loan Pricing under the 
Bank-Client Relationship, Journal of Banking and Finance 13 (2): 221-35. 
 
Hoshi, Takeo and Anil K. Kashyap, 2001, Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan, the MIT 
Press. 
 
                                                   
59    38
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil K. Kashyap and David Scharfstein, 1991, Corporate Structure, Liquidity and 
Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups, Quarterly Journal of Economics 106 (1): 
33-60. 
 
Hubbard, Glenn G., Kenneth N. Kuttner and Darius N. Palia, 2002, Are There Bank Effects in 
Borrowers’ Costs of Funds? Evidence from a Matched Sample of Borrowers and Banks, Journal of 
Business 75 (4): 559-81. 
 
Inders, Roman and Holger M. Mueller 2007, A Lender-Based Theory of Collateral, forthcoming in the 
Journal of Financial Economics. 
 
Ito, Takatoshi and Yuri Nagataki Sasaki, 2002, Impacts of the Basel Capital Accord on Japanese Banks’ 
Behavior, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 16 (3): 372-397. 
 
Kano, Masaji, Hirofumi Uchida, Gregory F. Udell and Wako Watanabe, 2006, Information Verifiability, 
Bank Organization, and Bank Competition: The Benefit of Bank-Borrower Relationships in Japan, 
RIETI Discussion Paper 06-E-003. 
 
Kashyap, Anil K. and Jeremy C. Stein, 2000, What Do a Million Banks Have to Say about the 
Transmission of Monetary Policy? American Economic Review 90 (3): 407-428. 
 
Degryse, Hans and Steven Ongena, 2005, Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition, Journal 
of Finance 60 (1): 231-66. 
 
Peek, Joe and Eric S. Rosengren, 1995, Bank Regulatory Agreements in New England, New England 
Economic Review May/June, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston 
 
Petersen, Mitchell A. and Raghuram G. Rajan, 1994, The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence 
from Small Business Data, Journal of Finance, 49 (1), 3-37. 
 
Petersen, Mitchell A. and Raghuram G. Rajan, 2002, Does Distance Still Matter? The Information 
Revolution in Small Business Lending, Journal of Finance, 57 (6), 2533-69. 
 
Pozzolo Alberto F., 2004, The Role of Guarantees in Bank Lending. mimeo. 
 
Rajan, Raghram G., 1992, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm’s-Length 
Debt, Journal of Finance, 47 (4): 1367-1400.   39
 
Sharpe, Steven A., 1990, Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts: A Stylized 
Model of Customer Relationships, Journal of Finance, 45 (4): 1069-87. 
 
Staiger, Douglas and James H. Stock, 1997, Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments, 
Econometrica, 65 (3), 557-86. 
 
Speigel, Mark and Nobuyoshi Yamori, 2006, Determinants of Voluntary Bank Disclosure: Evidence 
from Japanese Shinkin Banks, in Michael M. Hutchison and Frank Westermann, ed.: Japan’s Great 
Stagnation (The MIT Press). 
 
Strahan, Phillip E. 1999, Borrower Risk and the Price and Nonprice Terms of Bank Loans, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York, staff report. 
 
Uchida, Hirofumi, Greg F. Udell and Wako Watanabe 2006 a, Are Trade Creditors Relationship 
Lenders? RIETI Discussion Paper 06-E-026. 
 
Uchida, Hirofumi, Greg F. Udell and Wako Watanabe 2006 b, Bank Size and Lending Relationships in 
Japan mimeo, presented in 20th Annual TRIO Conference on Organizational Innovation and Firm 
Performance supported by NBER-CEPR-TCER, and Hitotsubashi Unviersity. 
 
Van den Heuvel, Skander, 2002, The Bank Capital Channel of Monetary Policy, mimeo, the Wharton 
School, University of Pennsylvania. 
 
Weinstein, David E. and Yishay Yafeh, 1998, On the Costs of a Bank-Centered Financial System: 
Evidence from Changing Main Bank Relations in Japan., Journal of Finance, 53 (2), 635-72.   40
Table I. Description of Endogenous and Exogenous Variables 
 
Variables Description 
Non-price terms   
C  A dummy variable that is set to unity if a firm’s loans from its main bank are (partially) 
collateralized by physical assets or by personal securities 
G  A dummy variable that is set to unity if a firm’s loans from its main bank are (partially) 
guaranteed by Credit Guarantee Corporations 
RELAT  
LENGTH  The length of the main bank relationship 
INFO  
DOC  The frequency of a firm’s reporting to its main bank (annual) 
DOC_WILL  The dummy variable that is set to unity if the firm reports to its main bank by the firm’s 
voluntary will rather than at its request. 
DOCWILL  The interaction term between DOC and DOC_BANK 
FAGE Firm  age 
BOARD  The number of board members 
OWNER  The dummy variable that is set to unity if the firm is owner-managed 
BANK  
BCAR  The book capital to asset ratio   
BBISCLASS  A dummy variable that is set to unity if the bank’s regulatory status is “international” 
BNPL  The ratio of non-performing loans to total asset 
BLOSS  The ratio of loan loss provisions to total asset 
BLIQUID  The ratio of liquid assets to total asset   
LNBTASSET  A logarithm of total asset   
RISK  
SCORE  The credit score of 0 to 100 (a firm with a score of 100 is the safest) 
FIRM  
CAPITAL  A firm’s book capital to asset ratio 
LNTASSET  the logarithm of total assets   
CURRENT  The ratio of current assets to current liabilities 
LNSHORT  the logarithm of short borrowing 
LNSHORT_MAIN  the logarithm of the estimated short-term loans from a firm’s main bank 
AGE  age of the firm’s representative 
HOUSE  A dummy variable that is set to unity if the firm’s representative owns residential 
housing 
EDUC  A dummy variable that is set to unity if the educational attainment of the firm’s 
representative is college or more advanced 
Instrumental variables 
ESTATE  The share of immovables in the total assets 
MOVAB+E  The share of movables in the total assets 
GELIGIBLE  A dummy variable that is set to unity if a firm qualifies to apply for credit guarantees 
from Credit Guarantee Corporations 
   41
Table II. Definitions of SMEs 
The Eligibility toApplying fopr Credit Guarantees from Credit Guarantee Corporations 
 
Industry  Equity is no more than  or
The number of employees is 




300 million yen 300
Wholesale 100  million  yen 100
Retail 50  million  yen 50
Service 500  million  yen 100
Mining 300  million  yen 300
Manufacturers of rubber 
products 
300 million yen 900
Lodging 50  million  yen 200
Software and information 
processing service 
300 million yen 300
 
Note: 1 dollar is equal to 122.48 yen as of October 31, 2002 and 1 dollar is equal to 108.99 
yen as of October 31, 2003.   42
Table III. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable names  Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Short rate  2.05 0.873 0.00 8.90 
Non-price terms         
C 0.918      
G 0.505      
BANK        
BCAPR 0.0370 0.0131 0.0011 0.0998 
BBISCLASS 0.358      
BNPL 0.0516 0.0199 0.0122 0.1505 
BLOSS -0.0171 0.0069 -0.0463 -0.0033 
BLIQUID   0.305 0.067 0.140 0.622 
BTASSET (100 million yen)  273,136 402,790 630 1,409,860 
LARGE 0.294      
REGIONAL 0.518  
REGIONAL 2  0.095  
SHINKIN 0.088  
RELAT        
LENGTH 35.6 14.6 2 91 
INFO        
DOC 4.3 4.2 1 12 
DOC_WILL 0.618      
FAGE 51.3 26.1 7 379 
BOARD 4.8 2.6 1 18 
OWNER 0.385      
RISK        
SCORE 57.2 6.5 25 80 
FIRM        
CAPITAL 0.252 0.228 -1.900 0.925 
TASSET (million yen)  3,993 7,055 49 74,935 
CURRENT 1.451 1.221 0.078 28.119 
SHORT (million yen)  968 2,756 0 46,772 
SALES (million yen)  3,992 6,231 63 56,990 
AGE 60.0 9.4 31 91 
HOUSE 0.941      
EDUC 0.648      
Instrumental variables       
ESTATE 0.242 0.171 0 0.912 
NONESTATE 0.070 0.117 0 0.788 
GELIGIBLE 0.945            
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Table III. Continued 
 
Variable names  Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Industry dummies   
Manufacturing  0.417  
Construction  0.191  
Information  0.005  
Transportation  0.028  
Wholesale  0.171  
Retail  0.055  
Real estate  0.022  
Services/restaurants  0.070  
Other  0.043  
Employees  82.7




1. 1 yen is equal to 122.48 dollars as of October 31, 2002 and 1 yen is equal to 108.99 yen 
as of October 31, 2003.   
2. The bottom value in the mean cell for “employees” is the median. 
3. For definitions of variables, see Table I   44
Table IV. Panel A. The Results of the First Stage for Collateralization 











  LENGTH 
(0.0005) (0.0005) 
INFO    
        0 . 0 0 1 8
  0.0016   DOCWILL 
(0.0011) (0.0011) 





  OWNER 
(0.011) (0.011) 
     0 . 0 0 0 6
*** 0.0006
***
  FAGE 
(0.0002) (0.0002) 




  BCAPR 
(0.557) (0.565) 
        - 0 . 0 2 5         - 0 . 0 3 3     BBISCLASS   
(0.019) (0.019) 
        - 0 . 6 7 6         - 0 . 7 0 3     BNPL 
(0.517) (0.524) 
        - 0 . 9 2 0         - 0 . 8 8 4     BLOSS 
(1.111) (1.125) 
         0 . 0 6 6
          0 . 0 9 4     BLIQUID   
(0.136) (0.136) 
        0 . 0 2 1 7
**         0 . 0 2 3 2
** 
  LNBTASSET   
(0.0106) (0.0105) 
          0 . 0 3 6
           0 . 0 3 4
 
  REGIONAL 
(0.035) (0.035) 
        0 . 0 3 2
         0 . 0 2 7     REGIONAL2 
(0.048) (0.049) 
         0 . 0 7 8
          0 . 0 7 2     SHINKIN 
(0.055) (0.056) 
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Table IV. Panel A. Continued 
 









  SCORE 
(0.0011) (0.0012) 
FIRM    
-0.093
***        - 0 . 0 6 8     CAPITAL 
(0.035) (0.036) 
       -0.0144
*       - 0 . 0 0 8
 
  LNTASSET 
(0.0160) (0.016) 
       - 0 . 0 0 8 2
       -0.0082
 
  CURRENT 
(0.0046) (0.0113) 
       0 . 0 5 5         0 . 0 5 8
* 














    LNSALES  
(the logarithm of sales)  (0.016) (0.016) 
Instrumental variables     
0.233
***      0 . 2 3 3
**    ESTATE 
(0.035) (0.087) 
-0.521
***     - 0 . 4 2 2
***
  MOVABLE 
(0.081) (0.086) 
0.077
*        0 . 0 7 7
* 
  GELIGIBLE 
(0.043) (0.043) 
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Table IV Panel A. Continued 
 





Interaction terms with ESTATE 
  0.512
*** 
















  Chubu 
(0.101) 
observations 1664 1664 
R-squared 0.249 0.271 
F statistic for excluded 







1. *, ** and *** show that a coefficient is statistically significant at 10 %, 5% and 1% respectively.     
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
3. Only coefficient estimates of interaction terms that are statistically significant at least at the 10 
percent significance level are presented. 
4. In addition, industry dummies and region dummies are included as control variables. 
5. For definitions of variables, see Table I   47
Table IV. Panel B. The Results of the First Stage of Public Credit Guarantees   











  LENGTH 
(0.0009) (0.0009) 
INFO    
       0 . 0 1 1 8
*** 0.0112
***    DOCWILL 
(0.0027) (0.0027) 





  OWNER 
(0.0236) (0.0240) 
     0 . 0 0 1 0
** 0.0009
** 
  FAGE 
(0.004) (0.0004) 




  BCAPR 
(1.106) (1.123) 
          0 . 0 3 5            0 . 0 3 0     BBISCLASS   
(0.033) (0.034) 
         - 1 . 3 9 7           - 1 . 2 9 9     BNPL 
(0.872) (0.895) 
         - 2 . 4 5 6           - 2 . 1 1 0     BLOSS 
(2.141) (2.158) 
        - 0 . 1 8 6
          - 0 . 1 4 7     BLIQUID   
(0.236) (0.240) 
       - 0 . 0 0 5
          - 0 . 0 1 0
 
  LNBTASSET   
(0.020) (0.020) 
         0 . 1 3 2
**           0 . 1 1 4
* 
  REGIONAL 
(0.063) (0.064) 
        0 . 0 9 8
         - 0 . 0 7 6     REGIONAL2 
(0.084) (0.085) 
         0 . 2 5 7
**           0 . 2 2 8
** 
  SHINKIN 
(0.111) (0.113)   48
Table IV. Panel B Continued 
 









  SCORE 
(0.0022) (0.0022) 
FIRM    
-0.392
***         - 0 . 3 6 9
***    CAPITAL 
(0.073) (0.080) 
         - 0 . 0 5 3
** -0.049
** 
  LNTASSET 
(0.022) (0.022) 














***    LNSALES  
(the logarithm of sales)  (0.024) (0.024) 
Instrumental variables     
         0 . 0 4 1
  -0.279
 
  ESTATE 
(0.066) (0.174) 
         - 0 . 2 4 4
*** -0.252
** 
  MOVABLE 
(0.093) (0.100) 
         0 . 1 2 7
*** 0.108
***
  GELIGIBLE 
(0.041) (0.041) 
Interaction terms with ESTATE 
-1.055
*** 




  Wholesale 
(0.199) 
observations 1664 1664 
R-squared 0.326 0.338 
F statistic for excluded 






1. *, ** and *** show that a coefficient is statistically significant at 10 %, 5% and 1% respectively.     
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
3. Only coefficient estimates of interaction terms that are statistically significant at least at the 10 
percent significance level are presented. 
4. In addition, industry dummies and region dummies are included as control variables. 
5. For definitions of variables, see Table I   49
Table V. 2SLS Regression Results for the Lending Rate   
(Continue to the next page) 
 
  C, G endogenous  C endogenous  OLS 





  LENGTH 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
INFO      
          0 . 0 0 8
          0 . 0 1 1
**        0 . 0 1 1
**
  DOCWILL 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
-0.000
  - 0 . 0 0 1          - 0 . 0 0 5  






  OWNER 
(0.041) (0.039) (0.035)
          0 . 0 0 2
         0 . 0 0 2
*          0 . 0 0 2
**
  FAGE 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)





  BCAPR 
(2.192) (1.938) (1.873)






  BNPL 
(1.506) (1.530) (1.467)
1.736  1.359         0.705    BLOSS 
(3.692) (3.648) (3.625)
          0 . 0 0 7           - 0 . 0 6 8           0 . 0 3 3     BLIQUID   
(0.405) (0.405) (0.393)
        - 0 . 0 3 6           - 0 . 0 4 1   - 0 . 0 3 5     LNBTASSET   
(0.034) (0.034) (0.033)




  REGIONAL 
(0.111) (0.105) (0.103)
        0 . 0 4 2            0 . 0 6 8           0 . 0 5 2     REGIONAL2 
(0.154) (0.152) (0.150)
        0 . 1 9 8            0 . 2 5 2            0 . 2 7 9     SHINKIN 
(0.189) (0.175) (0.173)
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Table V Continued 
 
    C, G endogenous  C endogenous  OLS 





  SCORE 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003)
FIRM      
          - 0 . 6 0 0
*** -0.668
***          - 0 . 7 3 3
***
  CAPITAL 
(0.130) (0.095) (0.091)
         - 0 . 2 2 4
**        - 0 . 2 7 8
***       - 0 . 0 1 3 2
***
  LNTASSET 
(0.104) (0.075) (0.020)
        0 . 0 5 9
*         - 0 . 2 9 3
***      0.0145    CURRENT 
(0.032) (0.065) (0.0104)
         0 . 0 9 4           0 . 1 2 0
**         0 . 0 0 3     LNSHORT 
(0.060) (0.048) (0.010)
          0 . 1 2 4
*         0 . 1 3 4






  AGE 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
       - 0 . 0 6 7
         - 0 . 0 8 0
**         - 0 . 0 8 3
**
  EDUC 
(0.042) (0.040) (0.037)
Non-price terms       
        0 . 2 6 0          0 . 3 5 6
           0 . 2 2 6
***
  C 
(0.258) (0.216) (0.055)
0 . 5 5 3           0 . 2 9 9
***          0 . 3 5 3
***
  G 
(0.348) (0.048) (0.035)
number of observations  1664  1664  1664 








1. *, ** and *** show that a coefficient is statistically significant at 10 %, 5% and 1% respectively.     
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
3. In addition, industry dummies and region dummies are included as control variables. 
4. For definitions of variables, see Table I   51
  
























average short rate  1.44  2.28 2.10 2.12  2.04 1.84
average credit score  60.6  55.4 56.1 58.2  57.5 59.4
frequency 9.35  18.05 23.85 21.87  12.91 13.97
number of observations  71  137 181 166  98 106
 
 
Table VI. Panel B. The Average Short Rate and Credit Score by CGC Coverage (%) 
 
  
no public credit 
guarantee 
more than 0% 
but no more 
than 40% 
more than 40% 
but no more 
than 60% 
more than 60% 
but less than 
100% 
100% 
average  short  rate  1.59 2.41 2.68 2.73 3.17
average  credit  score  59.5 55.0 53.8 52.6 52.2
frequency 47.22  39.73 5.68 5.80  1.57
number of observations  391  329 47 48  13
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Table VII. 2SLS Regression Results for the Lending Rate 




included  Smaller firms  Larger firms 





  LENGTH 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
INFO      
         - 0 . 0 0 1
  -0.000 0.015
** 
  DOCWILL 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
-0.004       -0.015
       0 . 0 1 0
 






  OWNER 
(0.061) (0.060) (0.058)
         -0.000       0.003       0.001    FAGE 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)





  BCAPR 
(3.740) (2.748) (2.961) 
         0.060  0.005  -0.109
 
  BBISCLASS   
(0.071) (0.079) (0.068) 
4.482
**    5.437
*** 1.030    BNPL 
(2.069) (2.249) (1.814) 
4 . 8 9 4           4 . 1 6 4   - 0 . 0 9 8     BLOSS 
(5.052) (5.533) (4.655) 
         0 . 0 6 9           0 . 7 3 4   - 0 . 7 4 1
 
  BLIQUID   
(0.598) (0.61) (0.487) 
        - 0 . 0 3 2          - 0 . 0 1 5           - 0 . 0 2 7     LNBTASSET   
(0.049) (0.054) (0.037) 
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Table VII Continued 
 
   
Collateral value 
included  Smaller firms  Larger firms 
RISK 




 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
FIRM      




  CAPITAL 
(0.248) (0.149 (0.179) 
         - 0 . 1 6 1
  -0.119 -0.128
 
  LNTASSET 
(0.128) (0.101 (0.088) 
         0 . 3 6 6
  0.008 0.108
** 
  CURRENT 
(0.364) (0.277) (0.050) 
        0 . 0 4 4        0 . 0 2 5       0 . 0 1 4
 
  LNSHORT 
(0.0838) (0.065 (0.057) 
          0 . 1 5 0         0 . 2 2 4
        0 . 0 4 2     HOUSE 





  AGE 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
       - 0 . 0 6 0         - 0 . 0 1 9         - 0 . 1 2 5
** 
  EDUC 
(0.068) (0.061) (0.056) 
Non-price terms       
        0 . 1 2 0         0 . 0 7 8         0 . 0 0 5     C 
(0.510) (0.306) (0.222) 
       0 . 3 0 0       collateral value relative 
to the outstanding  (0.465)  
         0 . 4 2 2
       0 . 8 4 6
***       0 . 5 9 3
** 
  G 
(0.412) (0.315) (0.273) 
observations 759 808 856 








1. *, ** and *** show that a coefficient is statistically significant at 10 %, 5% and 1% respectively.     
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
3. In addition, industry dummies and region dummies are included as control variables. 
4. For definitions of variables, see Table I 
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Table VIII. 2SLS Regression Results for the Lending Rate   
(Continue to the next page) 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 





  LENGTH 
 (0.011) (0.003) (0.003)
-0.043
     
  LNLENGTH 
(0.046) 
-0.043
      -0.043
*
  DISTANCE 
(0.046) (0.023)
INFO        
0.008
  0.009
           0 . 0 2 5
**           0 . 0 1 1
*
  DOCWILL 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.006)
     0.000




  BOARD 






  OWNER 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.110) (0.056)
     0.002       0.002           0.002
*          0 . 0 0 0
 
  FAGE 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
           0.0004
*   LENGTH* 
DOCWILL   (0.0003)
   0.0008
*  LENGTH* 
BOARD   (0.004)
   -0.0002
   LENGTH* 
OWNER   (0.0003)






  BCAPR 
(2.189) (2.189) (2.117) (3.348)
- 0 . 0 3 8           - 0 . 0 4 1            - 0 . 0 4 0            - 0 . 0 3 2     BBISCLASS   






  BNPL 
(1.505) (1.508) (1.504) (2.099)
        1 . 6 9 9           1 . 6 2 0   1 . 7 8 1   4 . 2 7 6     BLOSS 
(3.693) (3.698) (3.739) (4.864)
        0 . 0 6 4           0 . 0 9 0           - 0 . 0 5 1           - 0 . 1 0 2     BLIQUID   
(0.405) (0.405) (0.406) (0.576)
- 0 . 0 3 7   - 0 . 0 3 4           - 0 . 0 4 0           - 0 . 0 1 3     LNBTASSET   
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.051)
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Table VIII Continued 
 








(0.005) (0.008) (0.005)  (0.006)
  -0.0004
*  LENGTH* 
SCORE   (0.0002)  
FIRM        
-0.604
*** -0.589
***          - 0 . 5 8 2
**          - 0 . 4 3 7
**
  CAPITAL 
(0.130) (0.134) (0.130)  (0.186)
-0.226
**  -0.222
**          - 0 . 2 4 1
**           - 0 . 1 4 6
**
  LNTASSET 
(0.098) (0.098) (0.095)  (0.100)
     0 . 0 9 5        0 . 0 9 4            0 . 1 0 6
*          0 . 0 3 8
 
  LNSHORT 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.059)  (0.059)
       LNSHORT_MAIN 
  
      0 . 1 2 7
**        0 . 1 3 3
**          - 0 . 1 3 3            - 0 . 1 4 7     HOUSE 






  AGE 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003)
      - 0 . 0 6 8
        - 0 . 0 6 8
         - 0 . 0 6 8          - 0 . 0 3 3     EDUC 
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)  (0.064)
Non-price terms         
      0 . 2 5 2         0 . 2 2 6           0 . 2 2 6           - 0 . 0 0 5     C 
(0.249) (0.262) (0.262)  (0.331)
0.550 0.564  0.564
  0.776
**
  G 
(0.342) (0.343) (0.354)  (0.390)
observations 1664  1664  1664  832 











1. *, ** and *** show that a coefficient is statistically significant at 10 %, 5% and 1% respectively.     
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
3. In addition, industry dummies and region dummies are included as control variables. 
4. For definitions of variables, see Table I 
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Table XI. 2SLS Regression Results for the Lending Rate   




(Baseline)  Model 2  Instruments exclude 
interaction terms 





  LENGTH 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
INFO      
          0 . 0 0 8
         0 . 0 0 2            0 . 0 1 3     DOCWILL 
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011) 
-0.000
       0.002  0.003
 
  BOARD 





  OWNER 
(0.041) (0.054) (0.056) 
          0 . 0 0 2
        0 . 0 0 3
*          0 . 0 0 3
* 
  FAGE 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
BANK     
0.943
  3.453 -0.192    BCAPR 
(2.192) (2.944) (3.237) 
         - 0 . 0 3 7          - 0 . 0 7 8            0 . 0 0 7     BBISCLASS   





  BNPL 
(1.506) (2.422) (1.714) 
1.736 -0.122  1.644  BLOSS 
  (3.692) (6.365) (4.002) 
          0 . 0 0 7         0 . 1 1 7            0 . 1 6 3   BLIQUID 
(0.405) (0.592) (0.443) 
        - 0 . 0 3 6   - 0 . 0 4 1           - 0 . 0 4 2   LNBTASSET 
(0.034) (0.050) (0.042)   57
Table XI Continued 
 
   
Model 1 
(Baseline)  Model 2  Instruments exclude 
interaction terms 
RISK 




 (0.005) (0.007) (0.011)
FIRM      
          - 0 . 6 0 0
*** -0.665
***          - 0 . 7 2 9
** 
  CAPITAL 
(0.130) (0.163) (0.308)
         - 0 . 2 2 4
**       - 0 . 1 9 9
           - 0 . 2 8 9
* 
  LNTASSET 
(0.104) (0.124) (0.149)
        0 . 0 5 9
*       0 . 0 6 5
           0 . 0 2 1
* 
  CURRENT 
(0.032) (0.049) (0.148)
         0 . 0 9 4              0 . 0 0 0     LNSHORT 
(0.064) (0.000)
       0 . 0 8 5     LNSHORT_MAIN 
(0.084)
          0 . 1 2 4






  AGE 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
       - 0 . 0 6 7
        - 0 . 0 9 6
**        - 0 . 0 6 2     EDUC 
(0.042) (0.057) (0.057)
Non-price terms       
        0 . 2 6 0         0 . 1 7 2           0 . 9 1 6     C 
(0.258) (0.327) (0.833)
0.553      0.571  0.052    G 
(0.348) (0.467) (0.998
observations 1664  832  1664 








1. *, ** and *** show that a coefficient is statistically significant at 10 %, 5% and 1% respectively.     
2. Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
3. In addition, industry dummies and region dummies are included as control variables. 
4. For definitions of variables, see Table I 
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1. The horizontal axis represents the short rate. 
2. The vertical axis represents the frequency. 
3. The red vertical line indicates the short-term prime rate at 1.375 percent. 
 